Colombian armed groups
VS
Colombian government forces
Colombian armed groups are non-state armed organizations operating in Colombia, including leftist guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as the Gulf Clan and other criminal gangs with paramilitary or guerrilla militia structures.
Colombian government forces are the state's military and security institutions that combat these groups.
The conflict between them is a long-running armed struggle over territory, illicit economies, and political control.
The armed conflict officially began in 1964 with the formation of guerrilla groups, and it has continued for decades, making it the longest-running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere.
In early 2026, armed groups sharply increased drone attacks, more than doubling from the previous period, and civilians are caught in the crossfire.
According to Colombian estimates, paramilitaries were responsible for 45% of civilian deaths, guerrillas for 27%, and state forces for 12%.
As of March 2026, Colombia has up to 60 criminal gangs as well as armed groups with paramilitary or guerrilla militia structures, reflecting a diverse and fragmented criminal landscape.
*AI-generated summary of publicly available data. This is not an official statement of any party.
*AI-generated summary of publicly available statements and reporting. This is not an official statement of this party.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue the drone escalation reflects a fight over local territorial identity and survival, claiming rural communities see the state as a distant, foreign authority that never secured their borders.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups frame the drone campaign as self-defense of rural communities abandoned by the state, arguing that sovereignty belongs to the people in the territories, not to distant government forces.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that aerial bombardment is itself a foreign import, while rural guerrilla warfare grew from Colombia's own campesino history of self-defense.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that international humanitarian law doesn't clearly govern drone use by non-state actors, so these attacks fall outside established legal frameworks binding them.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that international humanitarian law binds all parties equally, and that drone use is not inherently unlawful if it distinguishes civilians from combatants.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that Common Article 3 binds all parties equally, so state forces claiming lawful distinction cannot shift sole legal responsibility for civilian harm onto the groups' drone use.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue the drone surge is leverage: doubling attacks forces Bogotá into negotiations and proves the groups can impose costs that conventional politics cannot.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue drones are a cheap asymmetric equalizer against a better-funded state military, and that doubling attacks signals leverage, not weakness.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that drone strikes killing civilians hand the groups recruits and moral authority; restraint, not firepower, is what erodes their civilian cover.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that the surge in drone attacks reflects their moral claim to self-defense against a state they see as failing rural communities, insisting sovereignty and protection justify their escalation.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that the drone escalation reflects a moral failure by the government to address rural neglect and coca eradication harms, framing their actions as self-defense against state abandonment.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that a state's moral duty to protect civilians rings hollow when that same state's forces are funded by and complicit with paramilitary actors, making its claim to legal authority over the battlefield suspect.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups invoke just-war tradition, arguing drone strikes defend their communities from state neglect, though church leaders warn civilians pay the price.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups invoke just-war tradition, arguing that Colombia's government forfeited moral legitimacy through corruption and failed peace accords, making armed resistance a defensible duty before God.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that scripture warns against trusting princes and armies for security, and that true peace is a gift of God, not a prize won by drones.
*AI-generated summary of publicly available statements and reporting. This is not an official statement of this party.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that aerial warfare is a foreign tactic imported from global conflicts, not rooted in Colombia's own rural traditions of struggle.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue drone warfare marks a cultural shift in a conflict long fought on foot, citing history: each new technology—from dynamite to motorcycles—reshaped Colombia's rural war, and they contend the state must adapt or cede ground.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that rural identity is not alien to the state, citing shared Catholic festivals and Spanish language binding those regions to Bogotá for centuries.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that international humanitarian law obligates state forces to distinguish civilians from combatants, so the drone escalation by armed groups, not government operations, drives civilian harm.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that under international humanitarian law, states retain lawful authority to use force against non-state armed groups, and that doubling drone attacks by such groups constitutes an armed attack justifying defensive response.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II bind all parties to a non-international conflict, so non-state armed groups using drones remain subject to IHL regardless of the weapon's novelty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue the drone surge proves armed groups exploit civilian cover, so retaking territory requires matching force with force; restraint only rewards those who hide among noncombatants.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that doubling drone strikes by armed groups proves negotiation failed, so state force must retake contested territory and protect civilians, whatever the cost.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that escalation invites harder military response, not concessions: a state that negotiates under drone fire rewards coercion and loses domestic legitimacy, so Bogotá's incentive is to refuse talks while attacks continue.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that states bear a moral duty under international law to protect civilians, so armed groups' doubling of drone attacks in 2026 makes defending noncombatants a legal and ethical imperative.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that international humanitarian law obligates all parties to protect civilians, and they maintain that armed groups’ doubled drone attacks in 2026 violate that duty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that a state's moral duty to protect rural communities cannot be claimed by armed groups whose drone attacks endanger those same civilians, arguing legitimate security belongs to the elected state alone.
Supporters of Colombian government forces invoke just-war tradition, arguing legitimate authority must protect civilians from armed groups' doubled drone attacks, and that preserving order is a moral duty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that defending civilians from armed groups is a moral duty rooted in just-war tradition, and that legitimate authority must protect the innocent.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that legitimate authority to wage war rests with the state alone, not self-appointed armed groups, and that church teaching condemns vigilante violence.
AI-generated summary of publicly available statements and reporting. This is not an official statement of this party.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue the drone escalation reflects a fight over local territorial identity and survival, claiming rural communities see the state as a distant, foreign authority that never secured their borders.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups frame the drone campaign as self-defense of rural communities abandoned by the state, arguing that sovereignty belongs to the people in the territories, not to distant government forces.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that aerial bombardment is itself a foreign import, while rural guerrilla warfare grew from Colombia's own campesino history of self-defense.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that international humanitarian law doesn't clearly govern drone use by non-state actors, so these attacks fall outside established legal frameworks binding them.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that international humanitarian law binds all parties equally, and that drone use is not inherently unlawful if it distinguishes civilians from combatants.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that Common Article 3 binds all parties equally, so state forces claiming lawful distinction cannot shift sole legal responsibility for civilian harm onto the groups' drone use.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue the drone surge is leverage: doubling attacks forces Bogotá into negotiations and proves the groups can impose costs that conventional politics cannot.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue drones are a cheap asymmetric equalizer against a better-funded state military, and that doubling attacks signals leverage, not weakness.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that drone strikes killing civilians hand the groups recruits and moral authority; restraint, not firepower, is what erodes their civilian cover.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that the surge in drone attacks reflects their moral claim to self-defense against a state they see as failing rural communities, insisting sovereignty and protection justify their escalation.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups argue that the drone escalation reflects a moral failure by the government to address rural neglect and coca eradication harms, framing their actions as self-defense against state abandonment.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that a state's moral duty to protect civilians rings hollow when that same state's forces are funded by and complicit with paramilitary actors, making its claim to legal authority over the battlefield suspect.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups invoke just-war tradition, arguing drone strikes defend their communities from state neglect, though church leaders warn civilians pay the price.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups invoke just-war tradition, arguing that Colombia's government forfeited moral legitimacy through corruption and failed peace accords, making armed resistance a defensible duty before God.
Supporters of Colombian armed groups counter that scripture warns against trusting princes and armies for security, and that true peace is a gift of God, not a prize won by drones.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that aerial warfare is a foreign tactic imported from global conflicts, not rooted in Colombia's own rural traditions of struggle.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue drone warfare marks a cultural shift in a conflict long fought on foot, citing history: each new technology—from dynamite to motorcycles—reshaped Colombia's rural war, and they contend the state must adapt or cede ground.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that rural identity is not alien to the state, citing shared Catholic festivals and Spanish language binding those regions to Bogotá for centuries.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that international humanitarian law obligates state forces to distinguish civilians from combatants, so the drone escalation by armed groups, not government operations, drives civilian harm.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that under international humanitarian law, states retain lawful authority to use force against non-state armed groups, and that doubling drone attacks by such groups constitutes an armed attack justifying defensive response.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II bind all parties to a non-international conflict, so non-state armed groups using drones remain subject to IHL regardless of the weapon's novelty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue the drone surge proves armed groups exploit civilian cover, so retaking territory requires matching force with force; restraint only rewards those who hide among noncombatants.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that doubling drone strikes by armed groups proves negotiation failed, so state force must retake contested territory and protect civilians, whatever the cost.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that escalation invites harder military response, not concessions: a state that negotiates under drone fire rewards coercion and loses domestic legitimacy, so Bogotá's incentive is to refuse talks while attacks continue.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that states bear a moral duty under international law to protect civilians, so armed groups' doubling of drone attacks in 2026 makes defending noncombatants a legal and ethical imperative.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that international humanitarian law obligates all parties to protect civilians, and they maintain that armed groups’ doubled drone attacks in 2026 violate that duty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that a state's moral duty to protect rural communities cannot be claimed by armed groups whose drone attacks endanger those same civilians, arguing legitimate security belongs to the elected state alone.
Supporters of Colombian government forces invoke just-war tradition, arguing legitimate authority must protect civilians from armed groups' doubled drone attacks, and that preserving order is a moral duty.
Supporters of Colombian government forces argue that defending civilians from armed groups is a moral duty rooted in just-war tradition, and that legitimate authority must protect the innocent.
Supporters of Colombian government forces counter that legitimate authority to wage war rests with the state alone, not self-appointed armed groups, and that church teaching condemns vigilante violence.
The UK government published a country policy and information note on March 19, 2026, stating that Colombia has up to 60 criminal gangs as well as armed groups with paramilitary or guerrilla militia structures.
Drone attacks by Colombian armed groups more than double in early 2026 compared to the previous period.
The New Humanitarian published an analysis on July 31, 2025, examining the surge in armed violence in Colombia and its origins.
The armed conflict in Colombia officially began in 1964 with the formation of two separate guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN.